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1. Introduction
On July 1, 2004, Seoul entered a new era in transportation
innovation. A transformation occurred: from a passenger car-
oriented transportation system to a bus-oriented public
transportation system; from a supply-oriented transportation
system where the supply and improvement of roads were tailored
to meet the increasing number of cars, to a people-centered,
demand-oriented transportation system; from a private sector-
centered system, where bus companies drew the bus routes to a
quasi-public bus operation system where the public interest
determines the routes. This reform has been successful.
The success of this reform, as well as its beginning, did not
happen merely by chance. It was only possible as a new paradigm
of an urban environment centered around people. Since improving
the lives of the citizens was the objective of the reform, citizen
support and participation were central. The Bus System Reform
Citizen Committee (BSRCC) was at the center of this, and in this
committee various stakeholders including the Seoul Bus
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Transport Association took part along with citizens. Trust and
mutual understanding was the foundation for participation.
Although it will be mentioned later on, no one could guarantee
success without the establishment of local autonomy and the
leadership representing the people and which citizens were able
to hold accountable. Since transportation problems involve
conflicting interests amongst various stakeholders, success is not
easy without the theory and practice of appropriate conflict
management. If Seoul could not manage the complexity and
diversity that the city-a metropolis of a population over 10
million-has, this reform would have failed. Thus success would
not have been possible without developments in the IT industry
and the development of an integral Transport Management
System via satellite. Yet, even with all these conditions in place,
success could not be possible if the will and expectations of the
citizens were not united. In this sense, this grand reform project,
Seoul's public transportation reform, goes beyond the boundaries
of transportation. It reformed Seoul.
But it even goes beyond that. This reform is a reform For
everyone who expects a mature local autonomy. This is because
the ideal of Seoulites is the ideal of the Republic of Korea, and
because localization and globalization are not that far apart. This is
why we feel the need to broadly research this accomplishment
and pass it on to later generations as a model. Therefore, I hope
to record this reform so that it can help those who are interested
in the democratic development of local autonomy.
2. Context of the Reform and Identifying the
Problems
(1) Rapid Urbanization and Traffic Problems
Korea experienced various socio-demographic changes while
achieving rapid economic growth after the 1960s. Of those
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changes, the rapid expansion of Seoul is remarkable. Seoul's
population was 5.4 million in 1970, but in 2003 that population
surpassed 10 million and the daily population flow is almost 29
million. In addition, the expansion of the Central Business District
(CBD) following economic growth led to the rapid increase in cars
in the limited urban environment.
For example, Seoul's current transportation infrastructure has
the capacity to hold 2 million cars, but the number of cars is close to
2.8 million, which is more than 60 times the number of cars in 1970.
Furthermore, the flow of traffic from around the Seoul metropolitan
area into and out of Seoul is over 3.15 million cars daily, thus in
reality more than 4.37 million cars are running in Seoul every day.
In brief, just by looking at the saturated state of cars, we can see
that Seoul's transportation problem needed an alternative.
Of course, Seoul's traffic problem did not arise overnight.
There have been previous efforts to tackle Seoul's traffic
problem. Continuous road traffic reform projects have always
been Seoul's number one agenda, and it is a fact that they have
had some effect. The fact that in 2004 the total length of trunk
lines ran 421.2km and of those, roads with more than 4 lanes ran
186.1 km shows Seoul's efforts.
However, road supply within a limited Seoul could not meet
the rapid increase in the number of vehicles. Additionally, Seoul
implemented a policy that supplied passenger vehicles rather than
public transportation after the 1980s to achieve the smooth flow
of traffic. One reason for this was that citizens avoided one form
of public transportation-the bus-due to inferior services.
Yet the rapid increase in passenger cars led to traffic
congestion and further decreased bus speed and citizens avoided
buses, which were slower than passenger cars, eventually leading
to the deterioration of bus company management. This meant that
the bus was not working as the main public transportation system.
Also, the bus routes were monopolized by private ownership of
bus companies and dissatisfaction and inefficiency worsened.
There were many areas where despite people's demand bus
service was not provided because routes were decided on with
the profits of the bus companies in mind.
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Privately owned bus routes created winding routes, long-
distance routes, and overlapping routes. Not only was this the
result of a lack of route coordination focusing on the public need,
but this also brought about the inferior bus environment and the
fall of bus companies. Since one more passenger meant an
increase in profit, bus companies treated passengers as luggage,
abrupt stops and speeding was a norm and buses even passed
bus stops without stopping so as not to take the elderly or the
disabled as passengers. These inconveniences drove citizens to
use the metro or private cars.
For mass transportation other than buses, Seoul adopted the
metro in 1975 and achieved success, but due to the rapid increase
in the number of people using passenger cars, Seoul's
transportation problem could not go beyond its poor state. Yet,
the bigger problem was the split amongst transportation modes.
In 2002, the mode share of buses and the metro was 60.6%,
while the passenger car was 26.9%. However passenger cars
covered 72% of the roads, and 79% of the cars in motion were
driver-only vehicles, carrying only the individual driver. As a
result, traffic congestion was at its worst and congestion costs
reached an annual 5 trillion won, with energy costs reaching 4.1
trillion won a year (cars 3.8 trillion won, buses 300 billion won).
Problems with traffic jams and congestion do not end as just a
traffic problem. Traffic problems cause air pollution and various
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<Table 1- 1> Decrease in the Average Speed of Seoul’s Buses
Year Average speed
1996 18.5km/h
2002 16.0km/h
Passenger car 19.8km/h
Bus 16.0km/h
<Table 1- 2> Average Speed of Passenger Cars and Buses (2002)
* Exclusive Median Bus Lane Construction Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government, Dec. 2003.
* Exclusive Median Bus Lane Construction Plan, Seoul Metropolitan Government, Dec. 2003.
traffic accidents, increasing socio-economic costs along with the
distribution costs, which are closely related to industrial
development. The metropolitan area including Seoul and
Gyeonggi-do, is the center of Korea's economy, thus an increase
in distribution costs can be a negative factor in industrial
competitiveness.
(2) Limits of Transportation Reform Projects and Demand for an
Increase in Transportation Capacity
So far Seoul has constantly operated road traffic reforms. As a
result, it is a fact that driving conditions have improved
considerably. However, these reforms were not backed by a
general perspective, thus they were mostly a one-time and
limited prescription. Just because congestion in a certain area has
been resolved does not mean we can ignore the possibility of that
congestion arising in some other place.
Seoul's traffic problem cannot be treated separately from the
development of the metropolitan area during the past decades.
During the development process, Seoul experienced urban sprawl
as well as rapid suburbanization, which formed the basic structure
of the broad metropolitan area. The population of these satellite
cities were mostly those who performed production activities in
Seoul. Therefore, traffic flow entering Seoul in the morning and
leaving for the suburbs at night built up an axis in the Seoul
transportation problem.
<Figure 1-1> illustrates this point. This figure shows the trunk
line network where exclusive median bus lanes were installed on
July 1, 2004. From this figure we can see that the metropolitan
area has developed into a radial spatial structure centered around
Seoul, and that Seoul's problem is not just limited to Seoul, but is a
complex issue combined with the problems of Seoul's satellite
cities. The reason why the spatial structure of <Figure 1-1> had
to be reorganized in transportation is illuminated in <Table 1-3>
below that shows the volume of traffic and cars coming in and out
of Seoul.
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However under current road conditions, the road use of cars
can only be limited. In reality, cars entering Seoul have always
experienced congestion, which resulted in the constant need for
the metro or construction of new roads. Yet, constructing new
roads is costly and their efficiency cannot be guaranteed. In
economic terms, constructing 1km of the metro line costs
approximately 130 billion won and extending the road 1% costs
approximately 3 trillion won. That does not even begin to
consider the time consumed in building roads and the metro.
Of course, road construction has various impacts other than
just solving transportation problems, such as the dispersion of the
<Figure 1-1> Long-term plan for adopting Median Bus Lane in Seoul city
* This figure shows the long-term plan of Seoul’s exclusive median bus lanes operated on July 1, 2004.
The exclusive median bus lanes will, in the long-term, expand throughout the metropolitan area.
Including the lines already in operation, a total of 16 roads reaching 191.2km will be installed in several
stages.
Pe
o
p
le
-
C
e
nte
re
d
Tra
nsp
o
rta
tio
n
Re
fo
rm
:
Se
o
ulM
e
tro
p
o
lita
n
G
o
ve
rnm
e
nt
REENERGIZING LOCAL GOVERNANCE 27
<Table 1-3> The volume of traffic and cars in and out of Seoul (2002)
daily compared to 1996
number of cars coming in and 
3.15 million increase of 470,000
out of Seoul
traffic flow 9.04 million cars increase of 2.85 million cars
Dongjak
Shinbanporo 8.4km
The exgisuing coeration
Step 1: 2004
Step 2: 2005
Future
In sodkion lines
Leoends
Gyeongin - Maporo 
16.2 km
Gonghangno
10.3km
Susaek - Seongsarno
9.9km
Siheung - Hangangno
18.7km
Tongil - Uijuro
10.8 km
Paju 
Munsan
Dongducheon
Uijeongbu
Dobong -Miaro 
15.8 km
Guri
Hanam
Songpa - Jayangno
9.6km
Gangnamdaero
12.8km
Seongnam
Bundang
Mangu - Wangsanno
14.3 km
Cheonho - Hajongno
15.9km
Bundang 
UiwangGwacheonUiwang
Anyang 
Suwon
Incheon 
Bucheon
Gimpo
Goyang
Ilsan
population and development of urban commercial areas. For
example, if we look at the impact of constructing line 2 of the
Seoul metro, the population rate between Gangbuk (north of the
Han river) and Gangnam (south of the Han river) in 1977, one
year before construction, was 65% and 35% respectively. Yet a
year after construction in 1985, the population rate between the
Gangbuk and Gangnam area was 54% and 46% respectively. This
change in population, of course, may not be due solely to the
construction of new roads, but its impact cannot be ignored.
However, it is difficult to overcome the limits of the road, and
we cannot force car drivers to use public transportation.
Therefore, Seoul's transportation problem needs a more
fundamental solution. That is, to change the transportation
paradigm that has dominated Seoul in the past. In other words,
let's change the paradigm of the transportation problem. If we can
reuse the roads more effectively instead of constructing more
roads, wouldn’t we be able to achieve results exceeding those of
road construction? Along with that, are there any ways to
stimulate the use of public transportation. That is, are there any
ways to improve the transportation capacity. This led Seoul to
operate the exclusive median bus lane.
Generally, metropolitan cities connect road systems and road
travel around trunk line networks. Therefore, we can improve the
efficiency of transportation by linking them with multi-functioning
sub-networks. In this case, how about reforming Seoul's public
transportation around the trunk lines? If we return the passage
rights of trunk lines to public transportation and limit the use of
cars which have a low mode share rate, wouldn’t the city's
transportation capacity improve? That's it!
In fact, in order to solve the traffic problem fundamentally,
making personal vehicle users use public transportation,
especially buses, is useful, and this is the common experience of
metropolitan cities worldwide. However, reforming the
transportation system into one centered on buses is very difficult,
and Seoul has made its share of attempts. Yet, these trials ended
in failure, the biggest reason being the fact that bus system
reforms involve complex interests of various stakeholders. It
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takes a 6 month settlement period just to change a short bus
route, and it is needless to mention the time it takes to design a
plan for its operation or to reach an agreement among
stakeholders.
However, the bus system reform was unavoidable. The longer
the delay, the more difficult it would be to reform the system. In
brief, if Seoul could reform the bus system, it would be able to
achieve major effects in less time than it would take with other
transportation means. It was all too clear that if Seoul could
reform the bus system then the city would also become more
competitive.
This is the backdrop of why Seoul implemented a “People-
centered Transportation System Reform”around the bus system
on July 1, 2004. This required a shift in transportation policy
paradigms that went further than just a mere road solution. It
asked that the needs of road users, the people, be reflected
beyond traffic-oriented solutions.
3. Direction and Strategy of the Reform
(1) Objective
Identifying the problems of the transportation system reform
had a clear objective. Reorganizing a few bus routes and
promoting the advantages of public transportation was not
enough. Basically, the transportation system reform needed a
revolutionary characteristic. The functional division of the urban
network had to be approached from the user-behavior
perspective, and improvements needed a reform feature for they
could not principally be just a prescriptive and one-time affair.
Without general reforms, the overall efficiency of bus routes
could not be improved by just reorganizing long-distance, winding
and overlapping routes.
The transportation system reform centered around the bus is
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directly related to the economic activities of the citizens, so it is
clear that this problem should be approached from the citizen's
perspective. Yet Seoul's traffic system is closely related with
conflicting interests of those such as the autonomous district
offices, bus companies, bus drivers, shop owners whose
economic activity is centered around bus stops, politicians such as
national assembly members and municipal council members who
need their support, the police agency responsible for traffic
safety, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, etc. So
their perspective cannot be omitted in the solution.
The objective of the transportation system reform may be to
solve the traffic problem, but there were various conflicts to its
solution. The diversity of stakeholders tells the tale. Therefore
the success of the transportation reform depended on identifying
the conflicts and reaching a consensus as well as providing a
rational plan. Although it was clear that the citizens who are the
consumers must be given priority, the interests of bus companies
and other suppliers could not be ignored. Thus it was Seoul's role
to overcome the unavoidable conflict and return the convenience
of public transportation back to the citizens.
(2) Direction and Strategy
The direction of the transportation system reform was clear.
That was to change the existing irrational system to a rational one
and the specific details of this change was the transportation
reform centered around the bus. Since the overflowing number of
cars could not solve Seoul's traffic congestion as an alternative to
public transportation, research clearly concluded that establishing
a bus-centered public transportation system was the alternative.
The problems of the existing bus system and alternatives
under review and chosen to solve these problems are
summarized in <Table 1-4> and <Table 1-5>. In short, it was “a
transformation from a policy that tried to keep up with
transportation demand to one that actively manages that demand,”
“a transformation from a competition of profits to one of service.”
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First, it was clear that bus routes should be determined
according to people's needs. If existing bus companies decided
the bus routes, they would decide on routes to maximize the
profit of the individual company rather than satisfy citizens’
needs. Bus routes are not private commodities. They have strong
public characteristics. In fact, retrieving the right to determine bus
routes from the bus companies is not an issue of invading private
property rights. Also it is a fact that there can be no bus operation
business that is not related with the public.
Seoul adopted reforms to introduce the concept of a quasi-
public bus operation system. In short, the quasi-public bus
operation system can be illustrated as follows: “Deciding bus
routes according to the public need; leave bus operation to private
companies, yet manage it at the public level and distribute profits
according to operation performance.”
The quasi-public bus operation system, if successfully
implemented, can improve inefficiencies such as long-distance,
winding routes and overlapping routes; can stop the deterioration
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<Table 1- 4> The Inefficient Bus System Prior to Reform
䤎Ignorance toward public interest due to the private operation of bus companies
䤎Difficulty in managing bus schedules at the city level because of schedules set
independently by each bus company
䤎Complex bus fare system where a flat fare was paid with every transfer
䤎Since bus companies determined the routes, decrease in efficiency due to disorderly
winding and overlapping routes 
<Table 1- 5> The Core of the Bus System Reform
䤎Establishment of the quasi-pubic bus operation system
䤎Integrated management at the city level by establishing a Bus Management Center 
䤎Introduction of the new transportation card and integral fare system: distance-based
fare system with no additional fee for transfers
䤎Dual system reform into trunk lanes and feeder lanes: installment of exclusive 
median bus lanes
in service quality due to excess competition among bus
companies; and can be the best way to promote the use of buses.
There is a prerequisite for the success of the quasi-public bus
operation system. Bus operation management must be handled in
a more rational method. This is now possible because of the
advances in technology, such as the establishment of the Bus
Management System. The Bus Management System gathers
real-time data on bus operation and the time distance between
buses, and provides this information to bus companies and
citizens. A computer terminal is installed on the buses and a
wireless communication system is put in place between the buses
and the Bus Management Center. 
Another fundamental technology required for the successful
implementation of the transportation reform is the new
transportation card system. Along with this, a new integral fare
system was put in place to promote the use of public
transportation. This new fare system does not charge for
transfers and is a distance-based fare system. Advanced IT
technology meeting international standards was implemented and
the Smart Card System was developed for use on both buses and
the metro, and this made the complex distance-based fare
system easy to calculate and also made it possible to manage the
transportation consumption of the citizens. In other words, this
made it possible to analyze the demand-supply of people using
public transportation, and through this analysis routes were
revised, and bus schedules and operation was rationally and
efficiently managed. Of course, this also made it possible to co-
manage or scientifically manage the operation profits central to
the quasi-public bus operation system. Furthermore, it also made
it possible to manage the bus operation environment in order to
improve service quality.
With the integral public transportation fare system, a single
fare system is applied to inter-modal transfers between public
transportation modes and citizens pay fares according to the total
distance they travel. For instance, when transferring to a bus,
citizens only pay the basic fare (no transfer fee) if the total
distance traveled is less than 10km, if the distance exceeds
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10km, then they pay 100 won for every incremental 5km they
travel. In the case of the metro, in order to decrease the fares for
long-distance travelers, the basic fare is adapted to 12km and
extra fare is charged for every extra 6km.
Another feature of the reform was reviewed and finalized as a
way to enhance the accessibility: punctuality and comfort of public
transportation. This was to adapt a dual lane system of trunk lines
and feeder lines according to its function in the bus route system.
At the center of this alternative was the installation of the
exclusive median bus lanes on the trunk lanes, to guarantee the
speed and punctuality of buses. The establishment of roads
exclusively designated for buses 24 hours a day would ensure
speed and punctuality of buses.
The dual system reform that distinguished routes between
trunk and feeder lines was a system invented to link routes
according to their functions <Table 1-6>. Trunk routes were
mainly those that used the exclusive median bus lanes along trunk
lanes for speedy travel and required speedy and punctual bus
operations. Feeder routes were in charge of conveniently linking
with trunk buses and the metro while circulating areas with major
transportation demand.
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<Table 1- 6> A Bus System that Links Routes According to Functions
blue trunk bus long-distance buses running on the major downtown trunk lanes
green feeder bus short-distance buses running in residential areas and on trunk lanes
yellow circular bus
shuttle buses running on circular routes within city center or
subcenter
red intercity bus
direct buses running between major cities in Gyeonggi-do and the
CBD/subcenter
4. Organization and Activities of the Task Force
The success of innovation lies on “who”identifies the problem
and “how”they seek a solution and implement it. In this respect,
innovation is ultimately a test stage for leadership. Additionally,
since innovation is done by the people, organizing a task force and
what that task force does was a core factor in Seoul's
transportation reform.
Seoul initiated a full-scale review to reform the transportation
system for the citizens in August 2002. The Seoul Development
Institute had already researched this problem 10 years
beforehand, and academia and citizen groups had shown constant
interest and had also researched this issue. However, someone
had to show leadership and manage, coordinate, and take on the
responsibility from the beginning until the end of the reform. In a
broad sense that someone was Seoul and in a narrow sense it
was the Mayor of Seoul with his Transportation Advisor and the
Department of Transportation. Since Seoul's road infrastructure
was not yet complete and road use was diverse, an organization
responsible for and with strong power over the management of
Seoul's traffic was critical for the success of the reform.
Seoul's task force for the transportation reform can be divided
into two. One was the Seoul Metropolitan Government, centered
around the Mayor, the Department of Transportation and the
Transportation Advisor, and the other was the Bus System
Reform Citizen Committee (BSRCC).
In September 2004, Seoul put the Transportation Operator
within the Bus System Reform Promotion Organization for the
bus system reform. Until then the Transportation Operator not
only supervised and managed the overall transportation at the
Department of Transportation, he/she was also a central figure
with close relations with the Seoul Police Agency, which was
responsible for traffic safety. This reform in positions was based
on opinions that an organization that would take on the
responsibility and oversee all the affairs was needed in order to
implement a bus-centered transportation system reform. The
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transportation system reform, where conflicts between various
stakeholders arise, requires a responsible body that can
coordinate and oversee all the partial problems from a general
perspective. Systematically gathering and managing the various
interests is possible only when there is a concentration of
information.
Seoul promoted an optimistic and active performance-oriented
attitude toward the bus transportation reform through personnel
exchanges and education. Because of many past failures, it was a
fact that the civil servants in the Seoul Metropolitan Government
would continue to be pessimistic towards any new attempt at
reform if nothing was done to change their attitude. Furthermore,
since the transportation problem involved closely related interests
with many stakeholders, personnel exchange was also a way to
break relations with existing stakeholders. This was vital to the
reform.
The results of a reorganization of the civil servant organization
were satisfactory. Whenever the stakeholders, such as
autonomous districts and bus companies requested information on
reforms, the task force in the Department of Transportation
eagerly went with their laptops and explained the reasons for the
reform along with the efficiency of the expected outcomes.
“Everyone went with eager and grateful minds.”This quote from
one civil servant who headed a team on CBD traffic illustrates the
change in attitude.
The BSRCC was a new form of a policy decision-making
organization that was to achieve specifically new urban
governance. Despite the fact that according to the law, the Seoul
Metropolitan Government had the right to make decisions on the
bus system reform, bus reform failures of 1996 and 1997, the
failure to install an exclusive median bus lane in the Dobong-Mia
route in 2003 shows that policy decisions without the participation
of stakeholders cannot be implemented.
The BSRCC was composed of the following actors: concerned
civil servants in the Seoul Metropolitan Government, members of
Seoul's Municipal Council who represented the citizens,
representatives of the Seoul Bus Transport Association, the
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Seoul Community Bus Transport Association, the Seoul Bus
Transport Trade Union, and traffic experts, heads of citizen
groups, the police agency, lawyers, accountants, etc. Since the
representatives of bus companies held a conflicting identity as the
object of Seoul's bus reform as well as its user and beneficiary,
their participation from the beginning of policy formulation was a
critical factor in the success of the transportation system reform.
5. Conflicts in the Process of Reform: Content
and Solution
Considering the diversity and scope of the impact of a public
policy, public policy is in fact an important cause of conflicts.
However, the conflicts that rose during the process of Seoul's
transportation system reform were more complex and difficult to
resolve. Above all, the different interests of various stakeholders
were behind this transportation reform.
The conflicts during Seoul's transportation reform, came about
since August 2002 when a serious review of the reform began and
lasted until July 1, 2004 when that reform was implemented.
Eventually, the new governance chosen to effectively manage the
conflicts among stakeholders-resolving conflicts by sharing policy
information from the beginning of policy formulation until
implementation and seeking the understanding of stakeholders and
efforts to persuade them-was an important factor in the success of
this policy. First, we’ll review the reasons why the test installment
of the exclusive median bus lane in the Dobong-Mia route failed in
2003, for this failure was the reason why this new conflict
resolution method was adopted. Then, we’ll review the
differences in participant interests and the major issues along with
the strategy and process to resolve these issues.
(1) Failure to Install the Exclusive Median Bus Lane in the Dobong-
Mia Route in 2003
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In 2003, Seoul saw a possibility for a transportation system
reform and attempted to install a pilot exclusive median bus lane
in the Dobong-Mia route. However, this plan faced the opposition
of many stakeholders and failed even before it was implemented.
Bus companies that had bus routes in this area expressed
strong opposition just at the fact that their area was chosen for
this pilot project, and showed their will to stop any future changes
that may arise from the soon to be implemented reorganization of
Seoul's bus routes. In addition, there was opposition from this
area's residents including the shop owners. The introduction of
the exclusive median bus lane was bound to bring changes in the
commercial situation of the shop owners who owned shops near
existing bus stops, so their opposition was fierce. Politicians
representing these shop owners also took part in the opposition,
emphasizing the interest of their residents.
The autonomous district, along with the police agency, also
stood in the opposition line stating poor measures to handle the
changes in traffic flow. They were afraid of complaints from
residents driving private vehicles as well as the traffic at
intersections due to the installment of the exclusive median bus
lane. In some ways the opposition from these stakeholders was
natural since the people could not know beforehand the efficiency
and comfort they would experience as an outcome of the reform,
and since the Seoul Metropolitan Government did not provide
enough information. In short, the most important reason this
project failed was because Seoul “first made policy decisions and
then unilaterally notified their decision to the stakeholders and
tried to implement it (DAD model: Decision- Announcement-
Defense).”
(2) Lessons Learned from the Failure
It was common for Seoul to first make policy decisions
independently and force its implementation, even with other
issues. The cause of the Dobong-Mia failure can also be found
within this reasoning. Not only was there a lack of effort to get
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understanding on the policy's rationality, the stakeholders’views
were not sufficiently reflected in the policy formulation stage and
Seoul was not able to provide a persuasive argument at the
implementation stage. Furthermore, even though policies
requiring overall reforms rather than partial reforms need social
consensus as a prerequisite, agreement was never reached,
causing this project to fail.
Thus, there was a need to recognize the difference of interests
among participants and to clearly identify the issues. Only after
that, can the conflict and strategies to resolve these conflicts be
identified. Also, Seoul usually made policy decisions and
announced them when dealing with traffic problems in the past, so
there was a lack of trust between Seoul and the stakeholders.
Without this trust, the success of a policy can not be secured.
(3) Conflict and Its Resolution Surrounding Seoul’s Transportation
System Reform
1) Conflicts Surrounding the Bus System Reform: Various
Stakeholders and Cases
There were various conflicts, but the biggest reason was that
there were various actors. For instance, the first conflict to rise
was about the quasi-public bus operation system, which came up
because of the different views held by the Seoul government and
the Bus Transport Association. Yet even when a conflict was
resolved others would rise and after reaching an agreement to
accept the quasi-public bus operation system, there were
conflicts among bus companies surrounding the right to decide
bus routes, which would determine the profit of these companies.
First there was the conflict between Seoul and the Seoul Bus
Transport Association surrounding the introduction of the quasi-
public bus operation system. Seoul went ahead with bus reforms
with the purpose to enhance the public characteristic of buses, a
public transportation method, but the Seoul Bus Transport
Association perceived the quasi-public bus operation system as
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an invasion of private property. The quasi-public bus operation
system became the center of conflict because it would return the
right to decide bus routes from the private sector to Seoul, and
because it meant the co-management of costs and profits
concerning bus operation.
After reaching an agreement to introduce the quasi-public bus
operation system, conflicts rose between Seoul and the Bus
Transport Association concerning bids for bus routes. The Bus
Transport Association insisted on giving priority to existing bus
companies and tried to limit other bus companies from entering,
yet Seoul tried to give priority to existing firms only for limited
licenses (giving priority only for the first 6 years). Bus companies
that owned the highly profitable “gold routes”showed especially
strong opposition looking for alternatives such as submitting a
constitutional petition on the right to decide bus routes. This went
beyond the conflict between Seoul and the Bus Transport
Association. It went on to reveal the potential conflicts among bus
companies surrounding this reform.
Next followed the conflict concerning the assessment of costs
and profit distribution of bus operation, which focused on after the
adoption of the quasi-public bus operation system. There was
conflict between Seoul and the Bus Transport Association about
the principals and standardization of operation cost assessment.
Another conflict to review concerned the employment relations
and salaries for bus drivers after the introduction of the quasi-
public bus operation system. This conflict showed the various
interests concerning Seoul, the Bus Transport Association and
bus company employees.
The fare system was also one conflict that could not be ignored.
There were views from the bus companies and the Seoul
Metropolitan Council that a rise in bus fare was unavoidable in order
to improve the quality of service and to stabilize bus management, but
citizen groups from the people's perspective opposed. In fact, this was
one problem that could always recur, but since the quality of service
has improved after the transportation reform of July 2004 and the
profits of bus companies has also increased, the conflict between bus
companies and citizens are expected to be resolved more easily.
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2) Alternatives and Process of Conflict Resolution
a) Organization of the Bus System Reform Citizen Committee:
Participation of Stakeholders in Policy Planning and
Implementation
First, Seoul organized the Bus System Reform Citizen
Committee (BSRCC) as a way to start from scratch with lessons
learned from the failure of the 2003 Dobong-Mia pilot project.
Members represented the stakeholders: they can be broadly
divided into the Seoul Metropolitan Government, Seoul bus
related groups, and citizens and citizen groups. Seoul made the
BSRCC a participant from policy planning and decision-making, up
until implementation.
Seoul was a central stakeholder as a policy planner and as an
actor responsible for ex post management. The Bus Transport
Association was the implementing agency that would specifically
implement the reform plan. The Bus Transport Association was a
key stakeholder as the object of reform as well as the real
operating actor of reform. Citizens were an important stakeholder
as the actual beneficiaries of the bus reform and as the final
consumer. However, because of their characteristics, it was not
easy to represent the citizens from the unspecified majority, so
citizen groups actively working in social movements from the
citizen's perspective and municipal council members whom the
citizens directly elected took part as their representatives.
Besides these actors, the police agency, the Ministry of
Construction and Transportation, the Ministry of Finance and
Economy who had policy rights or permit rights, and Gyeonggi-
do which had to be consulted concerning the long-distance
transportation network surrounding Seoul, etc. were also
stakeholders in Seoul's bus reform.
b) Sharing Information, Confirming Interdependency and the
Democratic Operation of Meetings
After the BSRCC was organized as a policy consultation
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framework including the various stakeholders, there was a
growing sense that they were the users and beneficiaries as well
as the object of reform. This led to a change in thought that it was
to their advantage that they express their opinions frankly
concerning major issues (conflicts). As honest public meetings
and discussions started to take place, all the stakeholders began
to realize that they were not separate entities, but rather in an
inter-dependent relationship and also shared the realization of
risks concerning the costs they would have to bear if the bus
reform failed. In fact, as the stakeholders shared the idea that the
profits of bus companies could not improve without the reform,
the conflict surrounding the quasi-public bus operation system
began to weaken.
Another thing that deserves emphasis is the principle of
sharing information. Seoul made it a principle to share all
information with other interest groups that requested information
as well as the BSRCC and provided frank data concerning the
limits of the bus companies, citizens’inconvenience, gradual
increase in traffic accidents, air pollution, increase in costs for
energy waste, etc. in case the reform failed. By publicly sharing
information, Seoul motivated stakeholders to discuss their
interests and request them to be reflected more honestly, and this
eventually played a big role in the democratic operation of
meetings.
c) Sticking to Principles and Flexibility in Negotiations
Since Seoul viewed the bus reform as an innovation and not
just an improvement, Seoul had a clear criteria for distinguishing
what it could compromise on and what it could not. The adoption
of the quasi-public bus operation system is one example, as well
as the installment of the new transportation card system. The
railway agency that managed the metro wanted a compromise
concerning the new distance-based fare system along with the
new transportation card system that supported this new fare
system, but Seoul did not yield because they viewed this as a
reform. The railway agency did not welcome the new card
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system, because if Seoul monopolized the system, they thought
Seoul would also enjoy the sole rights to the transportation
information such as potential passengers and profits.
On the other hand, Seoul also showed flexibility in
negotiations. Seoul resolved conflicts with existing bus companies
by acknowledging their priority concerning the right to bid for bus
routes in a limited manner--priority for 6 years. Seoul dropped
the win-or-lose way of thinking and started to solve problems
where it could reach a consensus. Also where financial assistance
was needed, Seoul's willing promise to provide support within
their limited means also helped in resolving conflicts.
d) Leadership of the Policy Decision-maker
One thing that cannot be omitted in conflict resolution is the
leadership of the policy decision-maker. There are many features
to the content of leadership, but in this bus reform the firm will
and patience of Seoul's mayor was highly appreciated.
The Mayor of Seoul not only promoted an active and positive
attitude through the training of related civil servants such as those
in the Seoul Department of Transportation, he also promoted the
reform with persuasion and patience. The two years-from
planning, which began in August 2002 until implementation on
July 1, 2004-was a period of constant pressure from many
stakeholders. In addition, as the third mayor to have been directly
elected by the people, this must have been a difficult period due to
pressure from Seoul citizens as well as citizen groups and interest
groups. Therefore, the fact that Seoul's mayor promoted this
policy to change the whole city through accountability and citizen
representation, shows that the leadership of the mayor was
indispensable to the success of the bus reform.
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6. Evaluation of Reform
Overall, we can evaluate Seoul's bus reform as a big success.
Among other things, we can consider the budget. In two years,
exclusive median bus lanes on 7 routes extending 77.5km in
length on trunk lanes was installed with a total of 183.8 billion
won. It takes approximately 130 billion won to construct 1km of
the metro and 3 trillion won to extend 1% of the road length. Also,
if we consider the construction time for these projects, the
following results of the reform are not at all exaggerated.
(1) Improved Transportation Efficiency - Punctuality, Mode Share,
and Speed
One consequence of the reform has to do with the punctuality
of the buses. On exclusive median bus lanes, buses arrive and
leave on time <Table 1-7>. Second is the mode share of buses.
Buses are now carrying more passengers <Table 1-8, 1-9>. The
speed of buses in constant congestion sections have increased
<Table 1-11>, and there have also been major improvements in
the average speed <Table 1-10>. In addition, environmentally
friendly buses such as Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) buses and
low-floor buses/non-step buses that let access to passengers in
wheelchairs have been introduced, thus enhancing the
convenience of Seoul's transportation.
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<Table 1- 7> Traffic Speed of the 3 Major Corridors and the Punctuality of Buses
Seen from the Deviation of Travel Time
Distance Travel Time Deviation in Bus Deviation in Passenger
(km) (min) Travel  Time(min) Car Travel Time(min)
Dobong-Mia 15.2 44.3 ± 2.7 ± 15.3
Susaek-Seongsan 6.8 18.1 ± 1.2 ± 15.6
Gangnam 4.8 16.7 ± 1.3 ± 4.6
Data: Exclusive median bus lane monitoring field study data (July 2004)
Data: Exclusive median bus lane monitoring field study data (July 2004)
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<Table 1- 8> Increase in Bus Mode Share
Median Lane General Lane Median Lane/General Lane
Traffic Volume (cars/hour) 206 696 0.15
Passengers (people/vehicle) 25.2 1.33 18.95
Mode Share (people/lane/hour) 5,308 948 5.78
<Table 1- 9> Passenger Transportation Rate in 3 Major Corridors
Traffic Volume
Passengers (people) Passenger(car/hour/lane)
Transportation Rate
Median General Median General
Dobong-Mia 166 1,282 21.21 1.38 4.08
Susaek-Seongsan 206 1,392 25.20 1.33 5.78
Gangnam 126 1,222 25.20 1.50 2.67
Data: Exclusive median bus lane monitoring field study data (July 2004) based on the traffic heading
towards city center
Data: Data prior to reforms (June 2004) and after reforms (November 2004) are based on the traffic
heading into the city center between 07:00-09:00 am.
Data: The bus data is from the BMS speed data, and data for passenger cars is from the ROTIS data.
Data: According to further analysis, the speed on Gangnamdaero is slower due to construction of metro
line 9.
<Table 1- 10> Changes in Average Traffic Speed Before and After the Reform 
in the 3 Major Corridors
Speed
Road
Before Reform After Reform
Dobong-Mia
bus
11.0km/h 21.4km/h + 10.4km/h(median lane) (94.5%)
car 18.5 20.3 + 1.8 (9.7%)
Susaek-Seongsan
bus
13.1 21.5 + 8.4 (64.1%)(median lane)
car 20.3 20.2 - 0.1 (0.1%)
Gangnam
bus
13.0 17.7 + 4.7 (36.2%)(median lane)
car 18.0 18.7 + 0.7 (3.9%)
Change
Compared to
Speed Before
Reform
(2) Increase in Social Benefits
Other results are as follows: Passengers are increasing and
while operation revenue has increased, the number of traffic
accidents have decreased considerably. The average fare for
buses has decreased and the social benefits have exceeded 2
trillion won.
First, if we look at the increase in passengers, the number of
passengers using public transportation has increased by 9.2%
(859,000/day) and the number of passengers taking buses has
also increased by 16.6% (636,000/day) <Table 1-12>. We can
relate this to the impact of the exclusive median bus lane and also
the integrated distance-based fare system along with the transfer
system that views the metro and the bus from an integrated
perspective and not as separate transportation modes. This is
also clear in the fact that operation profits are on the increase.
The profits for public transportation in general increased by
11.7% (663 million won/ day) and for buses it increased by 8.0%
(207 million won/day) <Table 1-13>.
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Data: Exclusive median bus lane monitoring field study data (July 2004) based on the traffic heading
into the city center
<Table 1- 11> Changes in Speed in Congestion Areas
Pre-reform(km/h) Post-reform(km/h) Change
Hansung Univ.→
Hyehwa Rotary 9.0 30.8 + 21.8 (242%)
(Dobong-Mia)
Jeungsangyo →
Moraenae overhead road 7.5 20.2 + 12.7 (169%)
(Susaek-Seongsan)
Gangnam St.→
Kyobo Tower 9.1 17.4 + 8.3 (91%)
(Gangnamdaero)
The number of bus accidents decreased considerably. The
average number of accidents decreased by 31.2% (207
cases/month) and the number of casualties has also decreased by
33.0% (326 people/month) <Table 1-14>.
Concerning the economic situation of the people, studies show
that the average bus fare has decreased by 6.5% (44 won)
<Table 1-15>. This also shows that the People-centered
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<Table 1- 12> Increase in Passengers
(Unit: thousand people/day)
Pre-reform Initial Stage Transition Period Stabilization  Stage
(‘04.1-6) (‘04.7-12) (‘05.1-6) (‘05.7-11)
Metro 4,590 4,539 4,556 4,469
Bus 3,827 4,025 4,197 4,463
<Table 1- 13> Increase in Bus Operation Revenue
(Unit: million won/day)
Pre-reform Initial Stage Transition Period Stabilization  Stage
(‘04.1-6) (‘04.7-12) (‘05.1-6) (‘05.7-11)
Metro 2,739 3,194 3,172 3,065
Bus 2,577 2,622 2,650 2,784
<Table 1- 14> Decrease in Bus Accidents (SDI ‘05 research data)
(Unit no. of accidents, people/month)
Pre-reform Initial Stage Transition Period Stabilization  Stage
(‘04.1-6) (‘04.7-12) (‘05.1-6) (‘05.7-11)
No. of
663 520 466 456Accidents
No. of
2,577 2,622 2,650 2,784Casualties
transportation reform has succeeded. The integrated fare system,
which sets the basic distance at 10km and charges an additional
100 won for every 5km exceeding the basic distance (including
the new transfer system where passengers do not pay any extra
amount when they transfer to other transportation modes), has
decreased costs. Despite this, the overall operation profit has
increased <Table 1-13>. In other words, the profitability of bus
companies improved in conjunction with improvements in overall
social benefits.
Society as a whole witnessed an astonishing increase in
benefits calculated at over 2.3 trillion won a year <Table 1-16>.
Air pollution also showed a clear decrease, proving that the
bus reform had an effect on enhancing the quality of the urban
environment as well as improving bus services and promoting
public transportation <Table 1-17>.
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<Table 1- 15> Average Fare per Travel (SDI ‘05 research data)
Unit (won)
Pre-reform Initial Stage Transition Period Stabilization  Stage
(‘04.1-6) (‘04.7-12) (‘05.1-6) (‘05.7-11)
Average
673 653 636 629
Fare
<Table 1- 16> Increase in Social Benefits (SDI 0´5 research data)
Unit (100 million won/year)
Decrease in costs for travel time 19,905
Decrease in costs for driving personal vehicles 3,077
Decrease in costs for traffic accidents 466
Decrease in costs for air pollution 411
(3) Improved Services
Other major achievements include the improved quality of bus
services. According to research data from the Network for Green
Transportation, this achievement can be summarized as in <Table
1-18>. Above all, under the quasi-public bus operation system, it
has become easier to adjust irrational routes, making it easier for
citizens to use buses, eventually leading to improved services.
Additionally, the upgraded transportation card, the scientific bus
management system (BMS, ARS announcements), better quality
buses, and the construction of transfer centers, etc. have made
positive contributions. The adoption of buses that are more
convenient, such as articulated buses, low-floor buses that are
accessible through wheelchairs, and environmentally friendly
CNG buses have also made contributions that cannot be ignored
<Table 1-19>.
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<Table 1-17> Specific Information on the Decrease in Air Pollution
Pre-reform (2003) Post-reform (2004)
Air pollution (CO:ton) 1,798.8 1,526.4
Air pollution (NOx:ton) 6,889.8 5,846.2
Air pollution (HC:ton) 390.5 331.4
Air pollution (PM:ton) 302.2 245.6
<Table 1- 18> Improved Bus Service Due to Constant Stabilization Efforts:
Network for Green Transportation Data
Initial Stage (2004.7) Stabilization Stage (2005.11)
Complaints  2730 cases a day 11 cases a day (a decrease of 99.6%)
Did not adapt to transferring Adapted to transferring
Transfer rate 23.7% Transfer rate  28.3%
Average no. of transfers 1.26 Average no. of transfers  1.15
Satisfaction Rate (2004.7) Satisfaction Rate (2005.6)
Above average  44.0% Above average  81.8%
Dissatisfied  56.0% Dissatisfied  17.5%
Support  84.8%
These visible results were possible because Seoul's bus
reform was not prescriptive and a one-time affair. In other words,
Seoul's bus reform was not a partial one-time project as with
other existing road improvement projects. It was unique in its
quality and scale.
We will have to wait to evaluate the overall effect, but the
results up to now show that it is sustainable. This is because,
currently in 2006, 191.2km of exclusive median bus lanes have
been installed in 16 trunk lanes. Socially, urban transportation can
be a constantly possible “sustainable innovation.”
(4) Effects Beyond the Improvement of the Transportation System:
Improved Recognition of Seoul and the Nurturing of the IT
Industry
As for the objectivity of this evaluation, the interest and good
reviews received from international organizations such as the
International Union of Public Transport (UITP: a leading authority
in public transportation with over 2000 members from 80
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<Table - 19> Operation of CNG Buses in Exclusive Median Bus Lanes (2005.2)
No. of Routes
No. of Vehicles No. of Vehicles
Traveling Permitted
Dobong-Mia
37 330 1,066
Seoul 30, Seoul 317, Seoul 946,
Gyeonggi 7 Gyeonggi 13 Gyeonggi 120
Susaek-Seongsan
35 286 724
Seoul 26, Seoul 286, Seoul 581,
Gyeonggi 9 Gyeonggi - Gyeonggi 143
Gangnam
47 77 700
Seoul 19, Seoul 72, Seoul 339,
Gyeonggi 28 Gyeonggi 5 Gyeonggi 361
countries worldwide) support the results. Also, the consequences
of Seoul's bus transportation reform are not limited to just
transportation. It supported the IT industry's advance into the
world market, it increased the brand value and recognition of
Seoul, and it improved the bus services throughout the country.
The details are summarized in <Table 1-20>.
<Table 1- 20> Globalization and Localization of the Performance of the Public
Transportation Reform
1. Globalization
1) Awards and Certificates
UITP Asia-Pacific Congress, Case Presentation (‘04.10) 
UITP Metropolis Award (‘05.5)
UITP “Certificate for Policy Excellence”(‘05.7)
2) Export
Bus system: Beijing, Ulaanbaatar
New transportation card: Kuala Lumpur
BRT infrastructure: Vietnam
CNG buses: Thailand, Iran
2. Localization
1) Daejeon: Operating a quasi-public bus operation system (‘05.7)
2) Busan, Daegu, Masan, Changwon: Preparations underway
3) Gimpo, Seongnam: Preparations underway as Gyeonggi province’s pilot project
To illustrate <Table 1-20>, Seoul signed a memorandum of
understanding with the city of Beijing on March 29, 2005 to
promote exchange and cooperation in transportation for the
successful organization of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The MOU
is an agreement on administrative support such as sharing of
information and technology in installing the intellectual
transportation management system (transportation card system,
computerized system for automatic fare collection, etc.), sharing
of technology between private companies, and funding.
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Export routes for technology have also opened and Seoul will
export the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) to Vietnam. The BRT is a
more advanced concept than the exclusive median bus lane,
where a three dimensional system with overpasses and
underpasses are installed and an automatic traffic sign system
that gives priority to buses are installed so that buses can pass at
intersections without stopping. The construction costs are only
10% of what it takes to construct the metro, so it is called the
“above-ground subway”that introduces the advantages of the
subway to bus operation. Contracts have been signed with
Thailand and Iran to export the CNG buses as well.
As a leading authority, UITP presented Seoul's experience at
its Asia-Pacific Congress, which was held in Brisbane, Australia
in October 2004, and at the Berlin Metropolis Congress in May
2005. Seoul's public transportation reform was evaluated as a
success in improving the quality of life for Seoulites and thus
awarded the Metropolis Award. In July 2005, UITP Peer Review
Team unanimously recognized that “Seoul Metropolitan
Government is successfully implementing a Public Transportation
Reform which is a fundamental step towards sustainable urban
mobility”and awarded Seoul the Certificate for Policy Excellence.
Seoul has also been a model case for bus systems nationwide.
Many local governments have sent their civil servants in charge
of transportation to Seoul to study this experience and Daejeon
has already adopted the quasi-public bus operation system.
Preparations for similar initiatives are also underway in Busan,
Masan, and Daegu.
7. Success Factors
The success of Seoul's bus-oriented transportation reform is
not an innovation that happened socio-economically by chance.
The relation between the transportation reform and the
Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project clearly shows this. The
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Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project began on July 1, 2003 and
ended in September 2005. During this period citizens and experts
were greatly concerned about the traffic congestion. However, in
the midst of this project, Seoul successfully implemented another
innovation, the public transportation-oriented transportation
reform.
We can study Seoul's successful transportation reform
focusing on existing innovation models or logic, and by looking at
the success factors we can help to generalize it in the future. By
looking back at the transportation reform process, we can see
that the innovative will of one person played a strong role.
In brief, the success factors of Seoul's transportation reform
can be listed as follows: 1) identification of a new problem and a
shift in paradigm, 2) successful conflict management, 3)
appropriate use of advanced technology, 4) leadership, and 5)
enforcement of local autonomy.
(1) Identification of a New Problem and a Paradigm Shift
If a new perspective in identifying Seoul's traffic problem and a
shift in transportation paradigm corresponding to this new
perspective did not exist, we could not imagine Seoul's
transportation reform. However, there was a major change from a
policy that used to catch up on transportation demand to a policy
that actively managed this demand.
A one-time partial improvement effort such as the widening of
roads and organizing traffic congestion sections have always been
limited in their success as just partial solutions. So, Seoul's view
that transportation should be managed as an integrated system
was innovative. Above all, the concept of management brought
about the quasi-public bus operation system, but in the past when
private bus companies determined the bus routes, viewing and
managing Seoul as a single integrated system was impossible.
The concept of the quasi-public bus operation system was
key to managing the transportation system. The quasi-public bus
operation system, through which Seoul retrieved the right to
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decide bus routes from the private bus companies made it
possible to change the whole city in the direction of higher
transportation efficiency for the whole city of Seoul. Systematic
management was also possible through the Bus Management
System (BMS). The BMS made it possible to realize the quasi-
public bus operation system, yet the BMS was itself possible
because of the introduction of the quasi-public bus operation
system.
Another important concept in the shift of transportation
paradigm was a “transformation from a competition of profits to
one of service.”This is a concept that cannot be separated from
the quasi-public bus operation system. This motivated the
competition of services among bus companies by letting Seoul
handle management and the bus companies divide the profits. Of
course, the improved services increased the citizen's benefits, but
in the long term it will also influence the profit of the bus
companies.
In fact, the enhanced awareness of the crisis in Seoul's
transportation problem was what motivated Seoul to adopt the
quasi-public bus operation system. In this respect, we cannot
ignore the fact that Seoul used this crisis as a starting point to
solve the problem. “From improvements to reform, from a
transportation problem to the problem of securing social
infrastructure, from follow-up to management....”Without
innovative ideas, and without the confidence and preparation for
these new ideas, Seoul's transportation reform would not have
been possible.
(2) Successful Conflict Management
Adopting the quasi-public bus operation system was in fact a
very difficult task. Notwithstanding the opposition of bus
companies of this being an invasion of private property rights,
there was also strong opposition from the commercial sector,
which had developed around the existing transportation system. It
was difficult for Seoul to deal with the opposition from politicians
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and autonomous districts representing this group. In this respect,
the approach and process Seoul took to manage conflicts was
highly appropriate. Until then, transportation policies “made,
announced and implemented decisions,”but in this reform, Seoul
adopted a whole new approach. With a whole new perspective on
conflict, Seoul sought the cooperation of stakeholders from
formulation to implementation and whenever faced with
opposition diligently worked to persuade the opposing party with
plenty of information.
A specific effort was the organization of the Bus System
Reform Citizen Committee (BSRCC). Seoul organized this
committee with stakeholders who would benefit or bear losses
through the bus reform and worked with them from planning to
implementation. Civil servants worked to seek support from these
stakeholders, who were the objects and beneficiaries of the
reform. For this, the training of Seoul's civil servants was also an
important factor we cannot overlook. Seoul did not stop at just
emphasizing the need for transportation reforms to its civil
servants, but went further to frankly open information on the
costs and benefits these stakeholders were expected to
experience as a result of the reform and tried to reflect the
opinions of the stakeholders in the policy. As a result, the
transportation reform plan was more realistic and Seoul earned
the cooperation of stakeholders.
(3) Use of Advanced Technology
If it was not 2004, Seoul's transportation reform could have
ended as a failure. Because, in order to operate a quasi-public
operation system, data on bus routes, intervals, and other
operation times, number of bus passengers, the distance-based
fare system, the traffic conditions of Seoul, etc. need to be
gathered.
Fortunately, a Smart Card System that integrated the metro
and bus fares and the Bus Management System could be installed.
This would not have been possible without the advances and
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cooperation from IT technology. Seoul was able to gain the
support of industries. The current management system is
advanced enough to simulate the expected demand and supply as
well as the current demand and supply. The potential to integrate
transportation information sheds light to the future development
of Seoul's transportation.
(4) Leadership
Leadership was a central factor in this reform, enough so to
mention Mayor Lee Myung-Bak. Above all, keeping in mind that
the mayor is a politician as well as an administrator, the fact that
the mayor took charge over the whole process of the reform
despite the opposition from various organizations and press
showed that “there can be no mission without leadership.”
It is difficult to plan the budget required for the reform while
managing Seoul's organization of civil servants, but this
transportation reform was psychologically a risky endeavor
because it was one in which no one had previously succeeded.
The numerous forms of opposition from stakeholders and the
criticism of the press, civil complaints, etc., show that the
transportation reform was not a simple project that would sail
through to success. A vision of the future, thorough and scientific
preparation, patience, etc., would be central for leadership to
promote the reform.
In fact, the criticism from the press right after implementation
on July 1, 2004 was difficult to bear. However, just 2 months
later, criticism turned to support and this clearly shows how
thorough preparations were and how practical and future-
oriented the reforms were. There would not have been leadership
without a clear vision and perception of one's role and without
leadership there would have been no successful reform.
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(5) Local Autonomy
Another factor to pay attention to along with the leadership of
the mayor of Seoul is local autonomy. In general, it is not easy for
a metropolis such as Seoul to just follow orders from the central
government and achieve efficient administration. Usually, the
central government cannot identify the diversity of a metropolis.
In this respect, the positive effects of local autonomy that was
reinstated in 1995 can be seen with Seoul's reform.
If there was no term for Seoul's mayor, it would have been
difficult for the mayor to take on the responsibility to lead reforms
that lasts for several years. If there were no financial
independence, implementation would have been nearly impossible
with opposition from the initial planning stage. Without the support
of the citizens, it would have been impossible to coordinate and
manage the complicated relationship of stakeholders’interests. If
the civil servants did not feel accountable through local autonomy,
it would have been difficult for them to have a positive and active
attitude towards reform through voluntary training and personnel
exchange. Seoul's transportation reform needed the cooperation
of Gyeonggi-do and if Gyeonggi-do was not an autonomous
entity, reforms would have faced quite an obstacle.
Actually, we cannot discuss the leadership of Seoul's mayor
and local autonomy separately. Because it would have been
difficult for the mayor's leadership to show consistency if the
mayor did not represent the citizens and if the citizens could not
hold him accountable. Of course, we cannot deny the fact that the
personal ability of Mayor Lee Myung-Bak played a major role.
8. Remaining Issues and Lessons Learned
Seoul's People-centered public transportation reform is an
innovative case of decentralization. Above all, the success of this
reform depended on the understanding and patience of the
citizens, stakeholders’participation, and the vision of a
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democratically elected mayor.
The success of this transportation reform did not stop at being
a bus system reform. Considering the impact it had on the
environment and the establishment of the social infrastructure,
the following goal of Seoul concerning transportation would be
modest. <Table 1-21> is a part of Seoul's plan in relation with the
2006 bus transportation.
<Table 1- 21> Development Direction: 2006 Year of Upgrading Public
Transportation Reform
1. Improvements in bus system operation
1) Increase of performance incentives, standardization of operation costs, voluntary
reorganization and increase of partnerships in order to establish the free
management system in the bus industry
2) Assess the appropriate number of buses in operation and find an alternative to
adjusting fares in order to financially support buses on a reasonable scale
2. Improve service quality in order to motivate private car owners to use buses
1) Introduce CNG buses, low-floor buses, and articulated buses in order to upgrade
buses
2) Utilize the BMS data and transportation card data and strengthen field inspections
in order to improve the service of drivers
3) Test run the Bus Information System (BIS) that provides bus operation
information to citizens, strengthen ARS guides and repair bus stop facilities to
improve the bus environment
3. These efforts aimed to achieve financial security through the continuous
development of the bus system and played a big role in revitalizing public
transportation in the long term.
Remaining issues concerning the transportation reform is
partly summarized in <Table 1-21>, but the bigger issue is
probably cooperation with other local governments. Since Seoul's
economic activities are directly related to Gyeonggi-do, it is
needless to say that the cooperation between Gyeonggi-do and
Seoul has to be close. This means that the authority of local
governments need to be connected.
These relations would be limited without changes in future-
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oriented perceptions. The required new perceptions are
informatization and globalization. This is a reality we cannot avoid,
so in a localized era represented by local autonomy,
informatization and globalization must be embraced.
Informatization and globalization require local governments to
overcome their local boundaries, but on the other hand it also
makes this possible. Yet here again, the need for closer relations
between local governments is confirmed. In this aspect, Seoul's
experience in transportation reform needs to be generalized and
researched in other local governments as well.
In fact, the autonomy of local governments is increasing as
time goes on. Although it is a pilot initiative, the enactment of the
Jeju-do Special Autonomy Act clearly reflects this change. Jeju-
do autonomously decides the number of members in its local
council. However, we must be aware that this autonomy can also
cause problems. Just looking at Seoul's transportation reform
shows that although close relations with other local governments
is required, it is not easy. Seoul's transportation management
system can only be sustainable if an operation system that
oversees transportation operation and transportation facility
maintenance is securely in place. However this kind of secure
management usually requires a director of traffic management
(DTM). This can collide with the diversity of local governments,
because it is not easy for democracy to coexist with the
concentration of information.
However, we learned an important lesson from this reform.
That is, the direct participation of stakeholders is needed. In the
case of Seoul, it was the Bus System Reform Citizen Committee
(BSRCC). This committee exchanged information and stated its
opinions with an open mind from the initial planning stage until
implementation as an equal to the Seoul Metropolitan
Government. This greatly contributed to the success of Seoul's
reform.
There was nothing different because it was a local
government. If you look at the local government as a member of a
committee, it is clear how we can work to solve the problems; in
other words, through identifying the mutual dependency and by
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recognizing the other party. As the world rapidly changes and
becomes diverse, interest relations become diverse as well. This
diversity needs to be accepted in a new form, whether it is a
transportation problem or an environmental issue. Accepting
diversity in a broader perspective is the lesson we should learn
from Seoul's transportation reform.
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